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This paper aims to place the Srebrenica massacre in its broader context, both in 
terms of its place in the Bosnian war, and theoretically. The Srebrenica massacre 
is the only war crime of the Bosnian war that has, in legal terms, been solidly 
confirmed to have constituted genocide. In the ICTY, 2001 convicted Radislav 
Krstic of complicity in genocide for his role in the Srebrenica massacre, thereby 
establishing the fact of the Srebrenica genocide. The ICJ, in its ruling of 2007 
in Bosnia vs Serbia, explicitly stated that the Srebrenica massacre was an act of 
genocide. However, the ICJ in the same ruling stated that other massacres of the 
Bosnian war, in particular those of 1992 when Bosnian Serb military forces were 
formally under Belgrade’s command, were not genocide.1 The ICTY has so far 
failed to convict any suspect of genocide except in relation to the Srebrenica mas-
sacre. Consequently, the Srebrenica massacre has assumed the status of a crime 
apart in the Bosnian war.
Introduction
The term ‘Bosnian genocide’ remains controversial. Whether or not there was 
a Bosnian genocide is something that divides scholars,2 and the claim that there 
was, lack a solid legal underpinning. By contrast, the fact of the Srebrenica geno-
cide is recognised not only by the international courts, but by almost all respect-
able scholarly opinion internationally, with one or two notable exceptions, in 
particular William Schabas and Katherine Southwick.3 This has been reflected in 
the memorialisation of the genocide internationally. For example, the European 
parliament voted in 2009 for member states to adopt 11 July as the date of com-
memoration for the Srebrenica massacre. The UK held its first Srebrenica memo-
rial-day event in 2013, and in 2015, sponsored a resolution to the UN to mark the 
20th anniversary. The choice to commemorate Srebrenica alone, rather than the 
Bosnian mass killings as a whole, may also serve to avoid making a bigger judge-
ment as to guilt and responsibility for the war. If we were to commemorate more 
1 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro): Judgement of 26 February 
2007. (2007). International Court of Justice. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/
case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf 
2 Hoare, Marko A. (2014). ‘Towards an Explanation for the Bosnian Genocide of 1992–1995’, 
Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 14 (3), pp. 516-532; https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12111 p. 
516
3 Schabas, William A. (2001). ‘Was Genocide Committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina? First Judg-
ments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, Fordham International 
Law Journal, 25 (1), pp. 23-53; https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol25/iss1/2; Southwick, Kath-
erine G. (2005). ‘Srebrenica as Genocide? The Krstić Decision and the Language of the Un-
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broadly than Srebrenica, would we commemorate only victims of Serb mass kill-
ings? Or of Serb and Croat crimes, which might include the Croatian shelling of 
Mostar? Or even victims of all three sides? Would we conflate the different sides 
in the conflict, or single out one side? These politically sensitive questions are 
avoided by picking just one crime to commemorate, which was both the biggest 
single massacre and the work of the side that was overall, vastly most responsible 
for the killings.
However, the effect of this is that the Srebrenica massacre has been allowed to 
overshadow the mass killings carried out by the Bosnian Serb perpetrators dur-
ing the war as a whole. This is despite the fact that the Srebrenica massacre was 
merely the last major episode of mass killing in the Bosnian war, and far from 
the largest. The biggest phase of mass killing was the initial Serbian assault on 
Bosnia-Hercegovina in the spring and summer of 1992. In that year, in East Bos-
nia alone, more Bosniaks were killed than in 1995, the year of the Srebrenica 
massacre, according to the figures of Mirsad Tokaca’s Research and Documenta-
tion Centre.4 The siege of Sarajevo also killed significantly more Bosniaks than 
the Srebrenica massacre (if both civilian and military casualties are included – as 
indeed they should be, since the two categories are not fully distinct when a geno-
cidal war is being waged against an entire population – compare, for example, the 
Warsaw Ghetto Uprising).
Concentration camps were established in the Prijedor region and elsewhere and 
were a key element in the killing process and the targeting of the civilian popula-
tion, a fact that is lost when genocide commemoration focuses on the Srebrenica 
massacre alone. In the Prijedor region, the genocide was particularly brutal as it 
targeted a region with a strong anti-fascist and social democratic tradition.5 In-
stead, international commemorations focus solely on Srebrenica which occurred 
late in the war, and it only the annual commemoration in Srebrenica, that receives 
any international attention. Furthermore, the genocide in Srebrenica is, widely 
though inaccurately viewed as an aberration or exception to the general pattern. 
The idea of Srebrenica as an aberration was reinforced by the ICJ’s 2007 rul-
ing. This found Serbia guilty of failure to prevent genocide in Srebrenica, on the 
grounds: ‘The FRY leadership, and President Miloševic ́above all, were fully 
aware of the climate of deep-seated hatred which reigned between the Bosnian 
Serbs and the Muslims in the Srebrenica region.’6 This formulation attributes the 
4 Hoare, Marko A. (04.01.2008).  ‘What do the figures for the Bosnian war-dead tell us?’, Greater 
Surbiton, available at: https://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2008/01/04/what-do-the-figures-
for-the-bosnian-war-dead-tell-us/
5 Sivac-Bryant, Sebina. (2016). Re-making Kozarac: Agency, reconciliation and contested return 
in post-war Bosnia (London: Palgrave); Wesselingh, Isabelle and Vaulerin, Arnaud. (2005). Raw 
Memory: Prijedor, Laboratory of ethnic cleansing (London: Saqi) 
6 ‘Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)’, ICJ, p. 186.
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massacre to local Serb-Muslim relations in Srebrenica, rather than to the inten-
tions of the Bosnian Serb supreme command. It also hints at victim-blaming, or 
at least a division of blame between victims and perpetrators. Some have claimed 
that the scale and ferocity of the Srebrenica massacre should be explained by 
reference to local Serbs seeking revenge for Naser Oric’s raids against the Serb 
villages surrounding Srebrenica. It is possible that individual rank-and-file Serb 
perpetrators may have had personal grievances against Bosniaks related to Or-
ic’s actions – this certainly emerges from David Rohde’s investigative journalist 
study of Srebrenica.7 But this cannot explain the presence of the VRS commander 
Ratko Mladic at Srebrenica, and the supreme logistical effort of the VRS needed 
to organise the systematic massacre of over 8,000 people and dispose of their 
bodies afterwards. As scholars such as Zarko Puhovski have suggested, this re-
duces the Srebrenica massacre to a ‘municipal genocide’.8
Furthermore, the idea that there was some sort of particular climate of hate be-
tween Serbs and Bosniaks in the Srebrenica municipality fails to consider the 
fact that the massacres in other areas of East Bosnia and Bosnia as a whole, were 
just as vicious and brutal, even if their scale was smaller. For example, in the 
Zaklopaca massacre in May 1992, Serb forces surrounded the unarmed village 
of Zaklopaca in the Vlasenica municipality, blocked off all exits from the village 
and massacred 63 inhabitants – men, women and children. Or in the Bikavac 
Hill massacre near Visegrad in June 1992, about 70 Bosniak civilians, women, 
children and the elderly, were barricaded into a house which was then petrol 
bombed – only one woman survived, severely burned. If anything, the careful, 
central, top-down planning that went into organising the July 1995 massacre, 
suggests it may have had less to do with the hatred of ordinary rank-and-file per-
petrators than some of the earlier, smaller massacres. In fact, the Srebrenica mas-
sacre cannot be understood except as an intrinsic part of the programme of mass 
killing that took place in Bosnia between 1992 and 1992. This was planned and 
set in motion by the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, then transferred to formally 
independent Bosnian Serb (Republika Srpska and Army of the Republika Srpska 
- VRS) command in May 1992.
There are strong grounds for deeming the Bosnian Serb extremist mass killings 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina as a whole to have been genocide. Namely, the goal of 
the perpetrators was to destroy the non-Serbs, above all Bosniaks, as a group or 
groups on the territory of the projected Republika Srpska; this involved actual 
destruction of the group in part. This view enjoys some support in the scholar-
ship and judicial record. You can hardly find two genocide scholars who will 
7 Rohde, David. (1997). Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe’s worst massacre 
since World War II (Boulder, CO: Westview) 
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agree on the precise definition of genocide, which results in part from the fact 
that the international legal definition embodied in the UN declaration allows for 
multiple interpretations. Nevertheless, several leading genocide scholars do char-
acterise the Bosnian Serb mass killings as genocidal, including Eric D. Weitz, 
Adam Jones, Norman Naimark and Martin Shaw.9 So do several experts on the 
Bosnian war themselves: Norman Cigar, Edina Becirevic and Smail Cekic.10 Oth-
ers disagree.
So again, the question as to whether the Bosnian Serb’s mass killings across the 
whole of Bosnia-Hercegovina should be categorised as genocide may depend on 
how broadly or narrowly the term is defined. It would be a much less controversial 
question if, instead of using the international legal definition, which was shaped 
by a political and diplomatic process in the 1940s, we use the original definition 
favoured by Rafael Lemkin, the man who coined the term ‘genocide’. Lemkin 
believed genocide should be deemed to include cultural genocide.11 The Bosnian 
Serb authorities conducted very extensive and systematic destruction of the cul-
tural heritage of Bosnia-Hercegovina – the destruction of mosques, graveyards, 
libraries and other cultural artefacts.12 The evidence of this was discounted by 
the ICJ judges, because cultural destruction was not included in the international 
definition. Had the international legal definition included cultural destruction as 
Lemkin had wished, there is no doubt Serbia would have been found guilty.
Yet even with the existing international legal definition, there are reasonable 
grounds for considering the killings to have constituted genocide. This was the 
opinion expressed by dissenting Judge al-Khasawneh, who argued that judges 
should have inferred genocidal intent from the consistent pattern of atrocities.13 In 
Germany, the courts that prosecuted the Bosnian Serb perpetrators Nikola Jorgic 
and Novislav Djajic concluded that genocide occurred in Bosnia outside of Sre-
9 Weitz, Eric D. (2003). A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press); Shaw, Martin. (2007). What is Genocide? (Cambridge: Polity); 
Jones, Adam. (2006). Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction. 3rd ed (London: Routledge); 
Naimark, Norman. (2001). Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)
10 Čekić, Smail. (2004). Agresija na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu: planiranje, priprema, 
izvođenje. Vols. 1–2 (Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog 
prava); Cigar, Norman. (1995). Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press); Cigar, Norman. (1995). Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy 
of ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ (College Station: Texas A&M University Press); Bećirević, Edina. (2014). 
Genocide on the Drina River (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press)
11 Moses, Dirk A. (2010). ‘Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide’. In The Oxford 
Handbook of Genocide Studies, ed. Bloxham, Donald., and Moses, Dirk A. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), pp. 19-42
12 Walasek, Helen. (2015). Bosnia and the Destruction of Cultural Heritage (London: Ashgate) 
13 ‘Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh: Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro. (2007). International Court of Justice. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/public/
files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-01-EN.pdf 
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brenica, specifically in the Doboj and Foca regions. Jorgic was convicted in Ger-
many of genocide, and appealed his case all the way to the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, which ruled that his conviction was in keeping with the international 
legal definition of genocide.14 Finally, the ICTY’s 2012  conviction of Zdravko 
Tolimir, Assistant Commander of Intelligence and Security of the Bosnian Serb 
army, determined that the group targeted for genocidal destruction was the Bos-
niak population of East Bosnia as a whole, not simply Srebrenica.15Although the 
2015 Appeals Chamber judgement in the case of Tolimir, modified his conviction 
and granted some minor aspects of his appeal, it confirmed the Bosniak popula-
tion of East Bosnia as a whole had been targeted for destruction
Even the ICJ verdict in the case of Bosnia vs. Serbia, which established genocide 
at Srebrenica but not elsewhere in Bosnia, nevertheless concluded that features 
of the 1992 mass violence were consistent with genocide, except that the proof of 
genocidal intent was lacking. The intent of the perpetrators is difficult to prove. 
The ICJ argued that Serb the perpetrators of the 1990s killings were motivated 
by the goal not of destroying the Bosniaks in whole or in part, but by the goal of 
establishing an expanded, ethnically homogenous Serbian state. This represents 
a confusion between motive and intent. For any genocide, the intent to destroy 
the group is motivated by the pursuit of additional goals – in particular, the sup-
posed or alleged need to save the perpetrators’ own national group from slavery 
or destruction, be they Turks, Germans, Serbs or Hutus.
Nevertheless, there are also respectable genocide scholars – i.e. ones who are 
not cranks or obvious apologists for the Serb nationalist cause - who dispute the 
categorisation of the mass killings across Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1992-1995 as 
genocide, such as Jacques Semelin and Michael Mann.16 Since there are reason-
able arguments that can be made both for and against the categorisation of these 
mass killings as genocide, it is reasonable to consider the political influences that 
led to the situation in which Srebrenica alone has been recognised as genocide. 
We might have the ideal of justice as absolutely impartial, or as absolutely politi-
cal, but the reality is that even respectable courts and judges may be influenced by 
political considerations, without being simply political courts. The US Supreme 
Court has both liberal and conservative judges, appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. So far as the ICJ ruling in the case of Bosnia-Herce-
govina vs Serbia goes, it could be seen as something of a compromise, given the 
14 ‘Case of Jorgić vs Germany’: Fifth Section, App no. 74613/01. (12.07.2007). European Court 
of Human Rights, Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR 
&id=003-2055877-2175646&filename=003-2055877-2175646.pdf&TID=thkbhnilzk 
15 ‘Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir’ (12.12.2012) ICTY – REFERENCE INCOMPLETE: NEEDS 
EXTRA DETAIL, SEE COMMENT IN BIB. 
16 Mann, Michael. (2005). The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press); Semelin, Jacques. (2007). Purify and Destroy: The Politi-
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multinational character of the ICJ, and the fact that its rulings to some extent rep-
resent a compromise between the national standpoints of different judges. Some 
of the judges did not believe the ICJ should even have jurisdiction in the case. So, 
there was a legal case for arguing that the ICJ had no business recognising the 
Srebrenica genocide in the first place. Nevertheless, not even the Russian judge 
disagreed with the view that genocide had occurred at Srebrenica. So, the idea 
that not even Srebrenica comprised genocide is clearly legally very weak.
The judicial recognition of the Srebrenica genocide was the result of a process 
that was not foreordained. The ICJ’s recognition followed on from the precedent 
established by the ICTY rulings. The ICTY’s recognition began with the Radislav 
Krstic ruling in 2001, but this turn owed itself to the internal politics of the ICTY 
Office of the Prosecutor. Not all the ICTY prosecutors wanted to prosecute sus-
pects for genocide, if the memoirs of Florence Hartmann and Carla del Ponte are 
to be believed.17 There were those, such as Geoffrey Nice, who wanted to stick to 
lesser charges more likely to result in convictions. This reflected a difference of 
opinion, among prosecutors, as to whether the ICTY’s purpose was to put perpe-
trators behind bars, or to establish the correct historical record. Had Nice, rather 
than del Ponte, been Chief Prosecutor, the Srebrenica genocide might not have 
achieved the recognition that it did.
Thus, there is not just one objective legal answer to the question of whether a 
particular process or act of mass killing is recognised as genocide or not. There 
are different legal opinions, and the question of which one establishes itself is 
the result of political struggles among those judges and prosecutors whose job it 
is to decide these matters. So, there are strong intellectual grounds for not see-
ing the ICJ ruling as definite. Therefore, there is a reasonable case for talking of 
a Bosnian genocide.  However, this debate over terminology is ultimately less 
important than understanding the place of the massacre in the overall programme 
of mass killings.
The idea of the Srebrenica massacre as a local aberration in the Bosnian war has 
been challenged by Edina Becirevic, in her 2014 work Genocide on the Drina 
River – the most serious academic study of the genocide in East Bosnia to date. 
Becirevic places the Srebrenica massacre as the culmination of a genocidal pro-
cess that began in the spring of 1992, when the assault on the Bosniak population 
of East Bosnia began  with the launch of coordinated and systematic massacres 
and expulsions across the region, and indeed the rest of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Even if the massacres in no individual region assumed the scale of the 1995 mas-
sacre, in total more people were killed that year. Although it is often ignored that 
17 Hartmann, Florence. (2007). Paix et châtiment: Les guerres secrètes de la politique et de la jus-
tice internationals (Paris: Flammarion); del Ponte, Carla. (2009). Madame Prosecutor: Con-
frontations with Humanity’s Worst Criminals and the Culture of Impunity: a Memoir (New York: 
Other Press) 
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women and children were also killed in the Srebrenica massacre of 1995, that 
massacre was above all, directed at combat-age males. Whereas women, children 
and civilians generally with no possible combat potential, were targeted more 
extensively in 1992.
In terms of killing of members of the victim group as an end in itself, many of 
these massacres were not less genocidal than the Srebrenica massacre. Certainly, 
they were deemed by the ICJ to be on a scale to resemble genocide, if you leave 
aside the question of genocidal intent. As Becirevic relates, Srebrenica was one of 
the few towns in East Bosnia not to fall to Serb forces in 1992. Along with Zepa 
and Gorazde, it held out, and was filled with refugees pouring in from surround-
ing localities. The population of Srebrenica, both locals and refugees, therefore 
comprised survivors of the first genocidal assault. The Bosnian Serb forces then 
continued their war against this population, attempting to make their survival 
impossible by siege and starvation – group destruction continued by other means. 
The genocidal process then reached its culmination with the Serb conquest of the 
enclave in July 1995 and the massacre that followed. This can be compared to the 
Holocaust, in which there were successive stages to the genocide.
This begs the question as to why Srebrenica was different from other massacres 
in the war, both in terms of the much larger number killed, and the particular 
focus on combat-age males. This can only be answered by looking at how the 
war had evolved since 1992. The genocidal goal of the Serb perpetrators was to 
destroy the Bosniaks and non-Serbs generally as a group or group on Serb-held 
territory. This destruction was to be accomplished by killings, torture, expulsions, 
cultural destruction and other means. The means shifted during the course of the 
war, but the goal remained the same. The continuity of Serb-extremist war-aims 
is indicated among other things by the siege of Sarajevo, which was established 
in the spring of 1992 and remained constant throughout the war. In the spring of 
1992, the Serb rebel forces were waging war against a population that was largely 
incapable of serious military resistance. They had every reason to believe that 
their victory would be relatively quick and easy, given the massive discrepancy 
in terms of armaments and preparation between the sides. This confidence was 
certainly shared by Western policy-makers, and helps explain the readiness of the 
West to recognise what appeared to be a fait accompli.
However, the war then dragged on for three years without a clear Serb victory 
over the Bosnian army. Against all expectations, the latter succeeded in organ-
ising itself, and by mid-1995 was beginning to gain the upper hand.18 By this 
time, mid-1995, the Bosnian army significantly outnumbered the Army of the 
Serb Republic, and its morale was superior, whereas Serb morale was in steep 
decline. The international situation was turning against the Serb rebel side. The 
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US had shifted away from outright appeasement and had begun to work to swing 
the military balance against the Serb side. Hence, the Washington Agreement of 
March 1994 had ended the Croat-Bosniak conflict and established the Federation 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Arms from Iran, Turkey and elsewhere were reaching the 
Bosnian army with US connivance. Retired US officers were training the Federa-
tion army.19
In Bihac, the Bosnian forces won a spectacular, if short-lived, series of victories 
in the autumn of 1994 that revealed the extent of Serb military decay.20 Croat 
forces recaptured Kupres in November 1994. Between mid-1994 and mid-1995 
the Bosnian army expanded the area in Sarajevo under its control and recaptured 
key areas there and (Mt Vlasic) in Central Bosnia, culminating in the ambitious 
but unsuccessful attempt to break the siege of Sarajevo in June 1995. Croatia’s 
Operation Flash in May 1995 revealed Serb weakness more starkly than ever, and 
presaged a general Croatian war-effort against the RSK. By mid-1995, the Bos-
nian army was capable of, for example, launching offensives on multiple fronts, 
and the Army of the Serb Republic would only have sufficient manpower to repel 
some of them.
In these circumstances, the Bosnian Serb leadership had every reason to believe 
that they were gradually losing a war of attrition in which above all, the enemy’s 
superior numbers would prove decisive. Consequently, it was no longer militarily 
wise to release captured Bosniak males, who would only return to fight as sol-
diers in the Bosnian army. It became a military necessity to destroy the enemy’s 
superior manpower by systematically killing prisoners. Rather than seeing the 
Srebrenica massacre as an act of revenge resulting from hatred, it should be seen 
also as a response to the reality that Bosnian army forces had shown themselves 
capable of inflicting losses on Serb forces, around Srebrenica and elsewhere. On 
the other hand, the increased global media attention on Serb crimes in 1995, as 
opposed to 1992 probably spared the women and children of Srebrenica, just as it 
had brought the closure of concentration camps in summer and autumn 1992. Had 
the Serb forces made additional conquests in the weeks following Srebrenica, the 
pattern of massacres would in all likelihood have been repeated. Zepa’s popula-
tion was spared at the price of a negotiated surrender of the town, while Gorazde 
came under NATO air protection following the outcry over Srebrenica. But as 
regards Bihac, which came under sustained Serb rebel attack after Srebrenica, 
there was no negotiated surrender and no NATO protection. Had it not been for 
19 Hoare, Marko A. (1998). ‘A Rope Supports a Man Who is Hanged—NATO Air Strikes and the 
End of Bosnian Resistance’, East European Politics and Societies, 12 (2), pp. 203-221.
20 Hoare, Marko A. (2011). ‘The Bosnian War’s Forgotten Turning Point: The Bihać Crisis of Au-
tumn 1994’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 24 (1), pp. 88 — 114. Available at: https://doi.or
g/10.1080/13518046.2011.549044 
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the Split Agreement and the launch of Operation Storm, there might have been a 
Bihac massacre in the pattern of Srebrenica.
The successive peace plans of the international community largely recognised 
the realities of military conquest. Thus, the Vance Owen Plan of January 1993, 
which at least on paper looked reasonably fair, insofar as it broadly divided Bos-
nia on the basis of pre-war ethnic local majorities, was followed by the Owen-
Stoltenberg Plan of August 1993, which was a more naked recognition of Serb 
and Croat conquests. Following the Bosniak rejection of the Owen-Stoltenberg 
Plan, the Contact Group Plan of July 1994 then scaled back Serb gains. The Serb 
side’s declining military fortunes would then likely have been reflected in suc-
cessively less generous territorial offers to them. There was therefore a strong 
incentive to secure a total victory in the battle for the strategically sensitive spot 
of Srebrenica, close to the border with Serbia and in the heart of VRS-occupied 
East Bosnia. As the investigative journalism of Ed Vulliamy and Florence Hart-
mann has shown, the US and its allies had already accepted that the existence of 
the East Bosnian enclaves was an obstacle to a peace agreement, and their con-
quest by the Serb forces was accepted in order to ‘tidy up the map’.21 The US was 
prepared to accept this conquest even at the price of large-scale war crimes. John 
Shattuck, the US assistant secretary for human rights, said ‘We had the Omarska 
model in mind’. So, the Bosnian Serb leadership acted in the correct belief that 
their conquest would not be opposed militarily by the West or the international 
community, and that they enjoyed a certain leeway to carry out atrocities in the 
process. However, they miscalculated over just how much leeway they did have, 
and the outrage over Srebrenica paved the way for the NATO bombing of VRS 
forces in August and September. Nevertheless, the Serb conquest was successful 
and was legitimised by the Dayton Accords – even though the rebel Serb side 
paid a considerable price for it.
The fact that genocide is generally accompanied by war, and that the form and in-
tensity of a genocidal process is influenced by the events and balance of forces in 
the war, is hardly controversial for genocide scholars. Without wishing to suggest 
equivalency between the Bosnian genocide and the incomparably larger-scale 
Nazi Holocaust, the latter can be used to illustrate this. If World War II had ended 
with a Nazi victory over Britain in 1940, the genocide of the Jews might have fol-
lowed the Madagascar Plan, with the deportation of Europe’s Jewish population 
to Madagascar. The genocide would have taken longer to carry out and been less 
absolute in claiming its victims. Likewise, if the Nazis had defeated the Soviet 
Union in 1941, the genocide might have involved the deportation of the Jews to 
Siberia, in which case, once again, it would have been slower and less absolute 
21 Hartmann, Florence and Vulliamy, Ed. (4/07/2015). ‘How Britain and the US decided to aban-
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in form. It was the inability of the Nazis to defeat their enemies, Britain and the 
Soviet Union, and their lack of a suitable location for mass deportation, that led 
to their adoption of the policy of total, immediate genocide of the European Jews. 
We could say something similar about the Rwandan Genocide, which was driven 
by the military advances of the Rwandan Patriotic Front during 1992 against the 
Hutu regime’s forces, followed by the Arusha Accords, which faced the Hutu 
supremacists both with a perceived deadly threat, and a window of opportunity, 
to solve finally the Tutsi ‘problem’ in the manner that they wished. Again, in 
the case of the Armenian Genocide, the genocide was driven in intensity by the 
deadly military threat faced by the Turkish nationalist regime during World War 
I, and the scale of its defeat by the Russians in late 1914 and early 1915 (at the 
Battle of Sarikamish). In each of these cases – the Jews, Armenians, Tutsis and 
Srebrenica Bosniaks – the intensity of the genocide was catalysed by the intensity 
of the military threat facing the perpetrating regime.
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